viewed the admissibility of confessions. The Court held that when an individual is deprived of his freedom and subjected to custodial interrogation, procedural safeguards must be used to protect the individual's right against self-incrimination. 18 If these safeguards were lacking, any admissions made by the suspect were inadmissible. The Court admitted that the confession rendered inadmissible under Miranda's stricter standard may not have been involuntary under the traditional test. 19 Miranda thus created a "bright line" or per se test which was to create a clearly defined constitutional guideline for the courts and law enforcement officials to follow: 20 a confession elicited without "adequate protective devices" (i.e. Miranda warnings) was not a result of the accused's free choice because of the inherently coercive setting of custodial interrogation, 2 1 and was therefore the product of compulsion and inadmissible in a court of law. 2 2 It appeared as though the voluntariness standard which considered the totality of the circumstances was no longer the law of the land. 23 The Court did recognize that an individual could waive the right to counsel. 2 4 As an example, the Court explained that "[a]n express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver." ' 25 The Court placed the burden on the state to show that the (1941) 478 (1964) , under the sixth amendment right to counsel. In Escobedo, the defendant's attorney was denied access to the room where the defendant was being questioned, a clear violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Miranda, however, involved the admissibility of confessions and the procedure required by the constitution in order to admit the incriminating statements into court.
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The Court held that an individual must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id. at 479.
19 Id. at 457. 20 Id. at 441-42. The decision was also meant to clarify any ambiguity resulting from the decision in Escobedo. Id 
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE
[ defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his fifth amendment rights, since the state controls the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 26 The Court continued to require "high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, '27 and it warned that a defendant's silence following the warnings did not constitute a valid waiver. The Court also stated that the eventual extraction of a confession did not prove that a valid waiver had been given. 28 Miranda, therefore, did not affect the status of truly volunteered statements, as long as police informed defendants of their rights.
29
The changes effected by Miranda, however, were soon tempered.
3 0
The Court later held that Miranda violations would not preclude the admission of statements into court for impeachment purposes, 3 1 or for establishing the credibility of a witness. 32 In addition, the Court narrowly interpreted the definition of custodial interrogation by allowing the receipt of incriminating statements taken at the defendant's home by Internal Revenue Service agents in an atmosphere described as "friendly" and "relaxed" 33 714 (1975) . In Hass, the accused asked to see his attorney after he was arrested for stealing bicycles. He then admitted that he knew the houses from which the bicycles were stolen. The Court held that although the accused had not been advised of his Miranda rights, the court could allow the officer to testify to the accused's admission to call into question the credibility of his testimony. 36 Id. at 301. 37 Id. In Innis, the accused in a murder case invoked his right to counsel and the police officers ceased questioning. While riding to the police station in a car, the police officers expressed concern that a child might find the murder weapon and injure herself The suspect then offered to show the officers where the shotgun was hidden. 49 In reality, it did a little of both. Edwards was the first case in which the Burger Court heard oral argument and decided to exclude evidence as a violation of Miranda.5 The Court held that once the right to counsel was asserted, the defendant could not be subjected to further 44 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975) . In Mosle, the suspect asserted his right to remain silent after being read his Miranda rights. Later, Mosley was reinterrogated after he was again advised of his rights. The Court ruled the incriminating responses made at this second interrogation were admissible. Id. at 107. The Court emphasized that the incriminating responses were elicited two hours later by another officer, in a different room, and focused on a different crime. In addition, the defendant's rights were read a second time. Id. at 98, 106. The Court did not indicate, however, which of these factors was dispositive. 45 Id. at 104. The Court found in losley that the police did not fail "to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind." Id. at 105-06. 46 1981) . Upon arrest, Edwards was informed of his Miranda rights. Before making a deal with police, Edwards asserted his right to counsel and interrogation ceased. The next day two detectives sought to speak to Edwards, but he refused. The guard told him he "had to" talk and took him to meet the detectives. The Court refused to admit the subsequent incriminating statements. Id. at 478-80. 48 Most authors concluded that Edwards created a per se rule that prevented the police from confronting suspects after they assert their right to counsel. Kamisar, Edwards v. (1981) .
50 In Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam), the Burger Court excluded a confession without hearing oral arguments. The Court stated that there was no evidence "to prove that petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his rights before making the inculpatory statement." Id. at 471; see Note, Miranda Lives, supra note 48, at 796; see also Stone, supra note 10, at 100-01. interrogation until his attorney was present "unless the accused himself initiates communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."
'
Edwards had the effect of prohibiting police officers from reapproaching a suspect to renew interrogation, but Edwards also left open the possibility of reinterrogation by creating the "initiation of conversation" exception to this rule.
The Court's opinion in Edwards contained two ambiguities. First, because the Court did not define the parameters of the initiation exception, courts alternatively interpreted the decision as creating a per se rule, 52 or as simply restating the Miranda decision. 5 3 Second, the Court failed to provide legal definitions of the words "initiate" and "communication, exchanges, or conversations.
' 5 4 Bradhaw afforded the Court the opportunity to clarify these ambiguities.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In September 1980, the police were investigating the death of Lowell Reynolds, whose body was found in his wrecked pickup truck partially submerged in a shallow creek. about events on the evening of Reynolds' death. Bradshaw admitted serving alcohol to Reynolds, a minor, but denied involvement in the traffic accident. 57 Bradshaw was then placed under arrest for providing alcohol to a minor and his rights were again read to him. A police officer continued to question Bradshaw and he replied, "I do want an attorney before it goes very much further." 58 The officer then ended the interrogation.
59
Sometime later, Bradshaw was taken from the police station to the county jail, a distance of ten or fifteen miles. Either just before or during the trip, 6° Bradshaw asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" 6 1 The officer replied, "You do not have to talk to me. . . since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will." '62 Bradshaw indicated that he understood. The two then continued their conversation, discussing where they were going and the charges to be brought against Bradshaw. The officer then suggested that Bradshaw take a polygraph examination to "clear this matter up," and Bradshaw agreed. 63 The next day, Bradshaw was again advised of his rights and signed a waiver card. 64 After the polygraph examination, the officer told Bradshaw that he believed Bradshaw was not telling the truth and that Bradshaw had been driving the truck when the accident occurred. 65 Bradshaw then changed his story and admitted that he had passed out behind the wheel of the truck after consuming "a considerable amount of alcohol." 66 Bradshaw was then "charged with first degree manslaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxicants, and driving while his license was revoked." 67 The trial court refused to suppress his confession, and Bradshaw was convicted on all three counts after a bench trial. We do not construe defendant's question about what was going to happen to him to have been a waiver of his right to counsel, invoked only minutes before, or anything other than a normal reaction to being taken from the police station and placed in a police car, obviously for transport to some destination. Though a conversation ensued, the police officer clearly took advantage of the opening to reinterrogate defendant ....
71
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the appellate court decision, and reinstated the trial court verdict.
72
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion reinstated Bradshaw's conviction, held that Bradshaw waived his right to counsel, and found no error in the admission of his incriminiating statements in the trial court. 73 The Court held that, according to Edwards, the initiation of conversation and the knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel are two separate inquiries that must not be combined into one test as was done by the Oregon Court of Appeals.
74
The Court then applied the two-pronged test to the facts of Bradshaw. The first test was whether Bradshaw "initiated conversation" with the police. The Court concluded that by asking "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" Bradshaw "evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation: it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.
' 75 Because the officer warned that "you do not have to talk to me," and Bradshaw indicated that he "understood," the plurality concluded that the Edwards rule against badgering suspects once they have asserted the right to counsel was not violated. 76 and require conformance thereto," and therefore it could reverse the trial court's factual finding that Bradshaw had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Id. 70 Id. at 1013.
7' Id.
72 103 S. Ct. at 2832. 73 Id. at 2835. 74 Id. In the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[T]he Oregon Court of Appeals was wrong in thinking that an "initiation" of a conversation or discussion by an accused not only satisfied the Edwaras rule, but ex propio vigore sufficed to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel. The inquiries are separate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them together. Id. Justice Marshall disagreed, however, and stated that the Oregon Court of Appeals failed to find that Bradshaw initiated the conversation and thus never reached the second prong of the admissibility test. Id. at 2839 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 2835. 76 
Id.
The plurality insisted that "[t]here can be no doubt" that Bradshaw's question "initiated" conversation in the ordinary sense of the word. 77 The Court stated it would recognize all conversations by the suspect after the assertion of the right to counsel as initiation except "inquiries or statements . . . relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship." 7 8 The Court held that because Bradshaw's question "could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally to the investigation," there was no violation of Edwards .
9
After passing the threshold test of initiation, Justice Rehnquist considered the second prong of the test: whether a knowing and intelligent waiver was established according to the Johnson v. Zerbst standard. 80 The waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if "the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused . . . reopened the dialogue with the authorities."1 8 '
The plurality held that the trial court had adequately weighed these considerations as the trier of fact and found that Bradshaw knowingly and intelligently waived his right. The Court found no reason to dispute these findings of fact and therefore reversed the Oregon Court of Appeals decision and reinstated Bradshaw's conviction. 82 Justice Powell concurred in the judgment because he agreed that waiver, an issue of fact, was properly decided by the trial court, 83 but he criticized the bifurcated standard used by both the plurality and dissent. 8 4 Justice Powell had hoped that "this case would afford an opportunity to clarify the confusion" that became apparent in the lower courts regarding the decision in Edwards, 85 and he was disappointed with the Court's two-pronged analysis which, he stated, would confound the confusion. 86 He instead recommended that the courts follow only the Zerbst standard because it had been widely understood and followed 77 Id.
78
Id. The only exceptions the Court recognized in Bradshaw were requests for a drink of water or to use a telephone. These requests, the Court stated, "are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." Id. 79 Id. by the courts in determining when a right had been waived. 8 7 He added that "[c]ourts should engage in more substantive inquiries than 'who said what first,'" and he refused to agree with the plurality that Edwards should be interpreted this way.
8 8 Justice Powell asserted that the bifurcated test applied by both the plurality and dissent has no basis in Edwards, because the facts in Edwards did not call into question who spoke first but merely considered whether the actions of the police were coercive. Thus, a two-step analysis was neither used nor required.
89
Justice Powell also criticized the threshold initiation test because a court may never get to the second step if the accused was not the first to speak. The dissenting opinion strictly adhered to this test and therefore did not reach the second step to consider the relevant facts and circumstances.
9 0 Justice Powell's criticism focused on the possibility that a valid waiver will not be recognized simply because the accused was not the first to speak. 9 1 Nevertheless, Justice Powell concurred with the plurality that the trial court "has had the benefit of hearing the evidence and assessing the weight and credibility of testimony. '92 Justice Marshall dissented, believing that "[t]o hold that respondent's question in this case opened a dialogue with the authorities flies in the face of the basic purpose of the Miranda safeguards.1 93 Justice Marshall recognized the importance of the right to counsel and emphasized the lawyer's "unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation.
'9 4 Justice Marshall pointed out that once the suspect admits that he cannot act on his own without counsel, a later decision to waive that right should be viewed with questionable reliability. 95 Like the plurality, the dissent applied the bifurcated standard but found that Bradshaw did not initiate a conversation under the first prong of the admissibility test. In determining whether conversation was initiated, Justice Marshall focused not on who spoke first, but on whether the conversation was "about the subject matter of the criminal investigation."
96 According to Justice Marshall, focus on the content of the conversation is warranted because the content should reveal whether the suspect invited reinterrogation upon speaking. 9 7 The dissent refused to agree with the plurality's claim that Bradshaw's question showed "a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." 98 Instead, Justice Marshall stated that "under the circumstances of this case, it is plain that respondent's only 'desire' was to find out where the police were going to take him." 99 Thus, Bradshaw's question was a response to his custodial setting and should be protected by the Miranda safeguards which "were adopted precisely in order 'to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.' "100
The dissent recognized that the right to counsel may be waived if it is clear that the accused reopened discussion about the subject matter of the investigation. Justice Marshall stated that lower courts have had no difficulty recognizing such situations 0 1 but asserted that there was no waiver of that right in Bradshaw. Because the "initiation of conversation" prong of the admissibility test is a threshold test, and Bradshaw did not initiate conversation, Justice Marshall never reached the second prong to consider the totality of the circumstances according to the Zerbst standard. Therefore, Justice Marshall concluded that the incriminating statements were inadmissible and stated that he would uphold the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals. The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, 10 3 implicit in the right against self-incrimination, 1 0 4 and may be waived only in a knowing and intelligent manner. 1°5 The right to counsel is unique: by asserting the right to counsel, the suspect is expressing the opinion that he or she is unable to cope with the situation without legal assistance.
6
Therefore, the judicial system should view the waiver of a previously asserted right to counsel with skepticism. Unfortunately, the Bradshaw Court failed to articulate a clear standard for determining the valid waiver of the right to counsel and created an additional loophole through which the police may extract confessions. The Court also retreated further from Miranda and once again demonstrated its intention to place discretion in the hands of local authorities by revitalizing the voluntariness standard. 1 0 7 The Court's decision is thus unlikely to prevent, and may facilitate, the violation of constitutional rights. The rights of individuals under arrest are protected by exclusionary rules that preclude the admission of illegally obtained evidence at trial. 0 8 These rules protect fundamental personal liberties afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination 10 9 and deter illegal police con- The privilege against self-incrimination . . . reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev., 1961), 317; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life," United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U.S. 391; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent." Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162.
duct, 110 especially when they are "bright line" orperse rules. Perse rules can guide police policy to prevent "well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous [sic] executive officers" from depriving individuals of their constitutional rights." 1 Therefore, the Court should have interpreted Edwards as establishing a per se rule excluding all confessions obtained after the accused invokes the right to counsel. The Court should have applied that rule in Bradshaw to hold that after Bradshaw asserted his right to counsel, his remark was merely a response to the custodial setting and therefore not a waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. This objective test would have better protected Bradshaw's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Additionally, this objective test would have provided a bright line standard against which law enforcement agencies could evaluate their conduct, and under which courts could interpret the law.
Unfortunately, the Bradshaw decision makes it more difficult for police and judges to determine whether an individual has waived the right to counsel, and accused persons must remain silent for fear that any simple question or remark will be regarded as a waiver of that right. After Bradshaw, officials must follow this procedure to obtain a confession: suspects must be read their Miranda rights. If the suspect waives these rights, 1 12 the confession is admissible; but, if the fifth amendment right to counsel is invoked, interrogation must cease. 1 13 This procedure, however, does not impose a blanket prohibition on interrogation. If the suspect waives the right to counsel by "initiating conversation," 1 4 interrogation may commence again, and any incriminating statements made at this time cannot be excluded from court on fifth amendment grounds. 115 The Bradshaw "initiation" exception is not consistent with the spirit 113 The Innir Court defined interrogation as "any words or actions on the part of the police • . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. The Court focused on the perceptions of the accused and held the police to a standard of reasonableness in their practices.
114 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 Ct. (1983 . 115 The Court did not specify how soon after the conversation is initiated that reinterrogation may begin. The police may have nearly an unlimited period of time since Bradshaw of Miranda, which requires a "rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney isperse an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." 1 6 Bradshaw places unnecessary discretion in the hands of local authorities who may gradually erode fifth amendment rights. 1 17 Law enforcement officials might wait for the suspect to initiate conversation so they may begin reinterrogation. 1 8 Since the Court ruled that a question as insignificant as "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" constitutes initiation of conversation for waiver purposes, it seems unlikely that officials would have to wait long for a suspect to start a conversation that would be recognized as a waiver of the right to counsel.' 19 This result is prejudicial to first-time offenders who are unfamiliar with police procedure and are less knowledgeable about their rights and how to respond to the custodial setting.
20
Miranda emphasized the inherent coerciveness of the custodial setting and placed 'a heavy burden of proof on the state to show a valid waiver.' 2 1 Despite these protections afforded by the fifth amendment 118 Likewise, trial courts may further erode a suspect's fifth amendment protections by applying the Bradshaw "initation exception" to fact situations where the suspect clearly does not intend to waive his right to counsel. These factual determinations are unlikely to be overturned by appellate courts which only rule on matters of law. It is likely that Bradshaw will be no more useful to trial courts than Mosl. The "scrupulously honored" test of Moslq has been applied to the facts of lower court cases, despite the Supreme Court's failure to establish guidelines for its application. "Consequently, the courts will, in all probability, admit confessions taken under conditions more coercive than those that existed in Mosly." Note, supra note 46, at 704.
119 Professor Kamisar explained:
[P]eople sitting close together in a vehicle are in a "social situation." They are likely to engage in "small talk" or to "visit." Few suspects in such situations are likely to snarl at their captors, "I don't talk to cops." Few suspects in such a situation are likely to want to irritate or offend their police "companions." Kamisar, supra note 48, at 108.
120 Studies have shown that Miranda is important because it has made suspects more aware of their rights, and because police know that their actions are subject to judicial review. Some suspects still do not understand their rights, however, and many researchers have concluded that counsel should therefore be available to all accused persons before interrogation begins. The Supreme Court's conflicting opinions 123 and the lack of a majority in Bradshaw demonstrate how difficult it is to recognize a waiver of the right to counsel and show the need for a clearly articulated standard. Edwards'perse analysis was meant to provide such a standard, but the plurality's application of the rule seriously undermines its efficiency. A clear exclusionary rule would preclude the admission of confessions elicited after the right to counsel was asserted, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."'
124
The plurality's per se analysis consists of two prongs. The first prong, a threshold test, requires courts to determine whether the accused "initiated conversation" after invoking the right to counsel. 125 If the court concludes that the accused initiated conversation the analysis proceeds to the second prong to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.' 26 The court will admit incriminating statements only after these two requirement are met. Although this two-pronged analysis appears sufficiently rigid to allow only "a few specifically established and well-delineated excep- 759-60 (1979) . In that case, the Court refused to extend the automobile exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the search of luggage obtained from an automobile. The Court stated that "we have limited the reach of each exception to that which is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society," id. at 760, and failed to extend the automobile exception or to create a new exception for the Sanders situation.
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tions,"' 27 in its application the plurality created an exception that prevents the test from being "a true guide to constitutional police action" by creating "'exceptions [that are] . . . enthroned into the rule.' " 28 The plurality, in the first prong of the admissibility test, focused on who initiated the conversation instead of the context of the initiated conversation. This broadens the exception to the point where almost any conversation by the suspect is recognized as a waiver of the right to counsel, as long as the accused was the first to speak. The plurality thereby defeats the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 129
Under the plurality's per se test, if a court determines that the suspect initiated conversation, it must then turn to the second prong to determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the suspect initiated discussion with the police.' 30 This standard has been applied in several different situations to determine whether criminal defendants have waived their rights.
"
The knowing and intelligent standard has most often been applied to test the validity of a waiver of counsel.132 Lower courts have found this standard easy to use to identify situations where the suspect truly wants to waive the right.1 33 Although the adoption of an absolute per se rule would afford the greatest protection of the rights of the suspect and would be practical to apply for the courts and police, 3 4 the opinions in Bradshaw indicated that the Court will use aperse rule only with exceptions. 35 To comport with the fifth amendment goal of protecting the accused, however, the Court should adopt the dissent's interpretation of the first prong of the nia 1 43 where the Court, in a plurality opinion, created a rule which was too refined to be consistently applied in cases of warrantless searches of closed containers found in automobiles. 44 Robbins was overruled by United States v. Ross,145 and a bright line rule was adopted in its place. The Court should likewise overrule the plurality decision in Bradshaw and establish a bright line standard for determining when a waiver occurs. It is clear from the opinions in Bradshaw that no reasonable guidance has emerged, and the Court should take the advice of Justice Powell and establish clear constitutional guidelines for determining the valid waiver of the right to counsel. 
